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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
Cert. No. 890145 
RULES DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for divorce and an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Elaine S. Sorensen filed her complaint on March 22, 
1985, in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County. 
The complaint subsequently was amended on March 12, 1986. The 
action was tried by Judge Rodney S. Page, without a jury, on 
October 27 and November 14, 1986. On February 20, 1987, the 
court entered a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the marriage 
between the parties and dividing the marital assets. 
tnb.reLaplbnef.sor 
On March 24, 1987, Dr. Sorensen appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Briefs were filed. Oral argument was 
conducted on November 28, 1988. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
On February 10, 1989, the Court of Appeals filed its 
opinion. It affirmed the district court, but reversed on the 
single issue of attorneyfs fees at trial. 
Ms. Sorensen filed a Petition for Rehearing, asking the 
Court for attorney's fees on appeal. The Petition was denied on 
March 23, 1989. Dr. Sorensen subequently filed his Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1953). 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Dr. Sorensenfs petition contains a long detailed 
statement of facts. Ms. Sorensen flatly disputes many of the 
statements and she believes others unfairly characterize the 
parties1 marital history, their accumulation of assets, and the 
relative contributions of the parties. Nevertheless, Ms. 
Sorensen will forego extended debate because those statements are 
largely irrelevant. The limited issues raised by the petition 
These abbreviations are used throughout: The record on 
appeal, as paginated by the court clerk, is designated flRlf; the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by Judge Rodney 
S. Page on February 24, 1987, are designated "Findings" or 
"Conclusions"; the Decree of Divorce, entered by Judge Page on 
February 24, 1987 is designated "Decree"; the transcript of the 
first day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. I"; the transcript of 
the second day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. II"; and the 
parties1 trial exhibits are designated "Tr. Ex." 
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permit a more brief recitation of the relevant facts. It is 
sufficient to note the following: 
The parties were married 11 years. Dr. Sorensen is a 
dentist who had practiced in Roy, Utah, for 16 years. Ms. 
Sorensen was not regularly employed outside the home during the 
marriage, other than to work with her husband in the dental 
practice. 
Among the many witnesses at trial were three called by 
the parties to value Dr. Sorensen!s dental practice. Dr. Richard 
Austin testified for Ms. Sorensen. He is a dentist practicing in 
the Salt Lake City area who also acts as a broker for the sale or 
purchase of dental practices. (Tr. Vol. I at 59). Dr. Austin 
presented to the court a written valuation of Dr. Sorensenfs 
dental practice. (Tr. Ex. D). The Exhibit and his valuation of 
the practice were based upon information supplied earlier by Dr. 
Sorensen in his answers to interrogatories submitted by Ms. 
Sorensen. (Tr. Vol. I at 68). Dr. Austin valued the overall 
practice by calculating the value of three components. (Tr. Vol. 
I at 66-76). The first was "tangible assets," including 
furniture and equipment, for example. He valued those assets at 
$15,330. (Tr. Vol. I at 68). The second component was "accounts 
receivable." He excluded all accounts unpaid for over 120 days, 
then discounted by 12% (to allow for uncollectible accounts) the 
total of those accounts then outstanding for no more than 12 0 
days. In this fashion he valued the accounts receivable at 
$22,170 as of October 21, 1986, one week before trial. (Tr. Vol. 
mb. rrLaplbnefjor 3 
I at 69). The third component was "intangible assets," which 
included the "goodwill" of Dr. Sorensenfs practice. Dr. Austin 
took the receipts and expenses of Dr. Sorensen's practice for 
three years and then calculated the average revenues over the 
period; that figure was $184,000. (Tr. Vol. I at 70). He 
discounted that figure by 66% to reflect an actual sale (assuming 
Dr. Sorensen would no longer be associated with the practice), 
yielding $62,560 as the total value of the intangibles. When 
added together, the three components constituted Dr. Austin's 
total valuation of Dr. Sorensenfs dental practice: $100,060. 
(Tr. Ex. D). 
Two accountants, Gerald Deters and Roger Nuttall, 
testified for Dr. Sorensen. Mr. Deters calculated the net income 
of Dr. Sorensenfs dental practice in 1974 (before the parties1 
marriage) and in 1986 (after separation) and concluded the 
practice was then "a little bit bigger, a little better" than at 
the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. I at 287-289). Mr. Nuttall 
testified that Dr. Austin's valuation of the dental practice 
should be reduced by $10,129 to reflect existing accounts 
payable. (Tr. Vol. II at 23). He believed the practice was well 
established in 1974, that Dr. Sorensen was then earning a median 
salary, and that neither of those conditions changed appreciably 
during the marriage. (Tr. Vol. II at 27). 
The district court took the matter under advisement. 
It made a ruling on January 5, 1987. (R. 65-78). The court 
believed the testimony of Dr. Austin. It found the total value 
mb.rrLaplbriefjor Q 
of the practice to be $100,000. (R. 82; Findings 5 14). The 
court discounted this figure by 10% because it also found that 
dental practices usually sell for approximately 90% of their 
appraised value. (R. 82; Findings 5 15). Then, because Dr. 
Sorensen had been in practice for 16 years and the parties had 
been married for 11 of those years, the court took ll/16ths (or 
69%) of the $90,000 value, for a net sum of $62,100, representing 
the value of Dr. Sorensen's practice. (R. 87; Conclusions 5 7 ) . 
The district court ordered an essentially equal division of the 
parties1 property. The professional practice went to Dr. 
Sorensen with an equalizing credit to Ms. Sorensen (R. 97; Decree 
1 26): 
MRS. SORENSEN 
Home $100,000 
Car 
Furniture & fixtures., 
Piano , 
Guitar 
Wolfcreek membership., 
Yard equipment 
Camera , 
Pension plan interest, 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
20,104 
TOTAL $13 6,3 69 
Less equity interest 
brought in , 5,800 
$131,369 
DR. SORENSEN 
Dental Practice $ 62,100 
*Farm 30,422 
Farm equipment 4,000 
Truck 400 
Spa 250 
*Dental Building 11,457 
Piccolo 2 , 000 
Computer 3 , 000 
Motorcycles 1,500 
Pension interest 31,241 
TOTAL $146,370 
Less equity interest 
brought in 15,000 
$131,370 
*Farm 
Contract Bienestar, 
Home Contract 
TOTAL 
Less 
Balance 
$ 78,200 
19,165 
42,000 
$139,365 
- 108,943 
$30,422 
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*Dental Building $ 74,000 
Less contract to 
Thompsons - 42,543 
Less amount to 
defendant's mother - 20,000 
Balance $ 11,457 
The court ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay his own 
attorney's fees and $2,000 towards his wife's fees. It ordered 
the parties to pay the expenses for their own expert witnesses. 
It also ordered them to divide evenly the expenses of one expert, 
Alan Heiskanen. (R. 96; Decree 5 23). 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Dr. Sorensen raised four issues on appeal before the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Each was decided against him. Now, he 
contends the Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to prior 
opinions from this Court and the Court of Appeals. He asks the 
Court to grant his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and to 
review anew each of his four issues. 
Dr. Sorensen's argument is not correct. The Court of 
Appeal's decision is wholly consistent with Utah law. There is 
no compelling reason to grant the petition. 
mb TKlaplbnefjor 6 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOLLOWED UTAH LAW WHEN IT HELD THE 
"GOODWILL" OF A PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IS A DIVISIBLE MARITAL 
ASSET. 
A. The Holding Does not Conflict With Prior Opinion 
of the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 
The Court of Appeals held the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a marital asset subject to valuation and 
distribution in appropriate circumstances. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989). Dr. Sorensen contends the holding 
conflicts with three prior opinions from this Court (Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Dogu v. Doqu, 652 P.2d 1308 
(Utah 1982); and Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 
(1966)) and with one prior opinion from the Court of Appeals 
(Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988)). 
The argument simply is not correct. The Court of 
Appeal's decision is thoroughly researched, well reasoned, 
artfully written, and in harmony with Utah law and with the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered the 
issue. 
Dr. Sorensen has not accurately described any of the 
four opinions mentioned in his petition. Consider first the 
Jackson opinion. There, defendant claimed the goodwill of his 
former partnership was an asset and he was entitled to a share of 
its value on dissolution. 415 P.2d at 668-69. In resolving the 
issue, the Supreme Court embraced what it then perceived as the 
mb rtLapibnef^or 7 
prevailing rule:2 a professional partnership does not have 
goodwill to distribute as a firm asset on its dissolution. Id. 
at 670-71. The Court did not consider the rule absolute, 
however. It noted there are decisions which reach a different 
conclusion because of their particular facts and circumstances. 
Id. at 670. Accordingly, the Court said the general rule applies 
in a partnership: 
unless the parties have in their partnership agreements 
provided otherwise, or the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case would require a modification of the 
general rule. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court reviewed the appeal record to 
determine whether the disgruntled partner had established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his former partnership had an 
asset of goodwill in which he was entitled to share. Jd. at 669. 
After examining the parties1 prior business affairs,3 the Court 
2
 The original quotation taken by the Supreme Court over 21 
years ago from American Jurisprudence was dropped from the 
current volume of the encyclopedia. Compare 40 Am. Jur. 
Partnership § 271, at 316 (1942), with 59 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 
§ 338, at 413-414 (1987). American Jurisprudence Second concedes 
that what once may have been considered the "general rule" is not 
accepted now in most jurisdictions having considered the issue 
and that the existence of goodwill in a professional business is 
a question of fact, not law. 
The Court would have been better served when deciding 
Jackson if it had relied upon 24 Am. Jur. Good Will § 11, at 808 
(1942). Section 11 correctly states that the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a valuable, yet intangible, asset which 
can be transferred. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 
2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting and applying § 
11) . 
3
 The Court found the partners had agreed not to carry 
goodwill as an asset on the partnership books; at the time of 
dissolution they had valued the business assets without 
(continued...) 
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concluded "the weight of the evidence preponderates that under 
the facts and circumstances of this case" there was not goodwill 
in the old partnership for the partner and, for that reason, the 
finding of the district court was correct• Id, at 671. The 
Court did not rule as a matter of law in Jackson. It focused on 
the record evidence because the existence, valuation, and 
allocation of goodwill are questions of fact. 
Dr. Sorensen's reliance on Dogu is equally misplaced. 
The facts of the case, the issues, even the dicta emphasized by 
Dr. Sorensen in his petition (at 11-12) — none of these address 
the issue of establishing goodwill. Dogu offers no guidance. 
In Gardner, this Court squarely recognized goodwill as 
a distributable marital asset. There, the spouses wrestled with 
the proper division of their marital assets, including a medical 
clinic where the husband, a general surgeon, was employed. Both 
parties valued the husband's interest in the clinic. The Supreme 
Court noted that in the valuation process, neither party gave any 
"consideration to the good will inherent in the professional 
clinic." Id. at 1080. That observation was more fully 
explained in a footnote: 
A marriage may be analogized to a partnership. 
Upon dissolution of the marital "partnership," an 
equitable distribution should be based on consideration 
of all assets, not just those that survive the trip to 
the bottom of the balance sheet. Where appropriate, 
value may be given to that 'something in business which 
3(...continued) 
consideration for goodwill; and there was not an adequate showing 
the partnership agreement contemplated the use of goodwill to 
compute book value. 415 P.2d at 671. 
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gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the race 
of competition,f commonly known as good will. Jackson 
v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 667, 670 
(1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income from 
its continued patronage is commonly referred to as good 
will. Good will is properly subject to equitable 
distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Duqan v. Dugan, 
92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of 
Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see 
The Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings, 18 
Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
Id. at 1080, n.l. 
The Court of Appeals held goodwill to be a marital 
asset in Stevens. There, the wife contended the district court 
had failed to value and distribute the farming and feed-hauling 
operations pursued by the husband. See claimed the operations 
had an asset of goodwill. The Court of Appeals held her claim 
failed on two grounds. First, her expert witness had testified 
that his appraisal utilized standard procedures for valuing 
"going concern" businesses. Thus, the wife's expert testimony 
had confused "goodwill" with "going concern value." Id. at 957. 
Second, she failed to meet her burden of proof that the business 
activities enjoyed the type of patronage or reputation found 
within "goodwill." Id. at 956-957. 
The Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis with a brief 
discussion of goodwill: 
The presence of good will may be evidenced by proof of 
an on-going competitive enterprise having continuity of 
place and commercial name and enjoying a favorable 
reputation founded upon prior sales of goods or 
services. 38 Am.Jur.2d Good Will §§ 4-8 (1968). The 
presence or absence of good will depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case. See Jackson, 
18 Utah 2d at 86-87, 415 P.2d at 670-71. Where 
10 
appropriate, the good will value of a business 
enterprise is subject to equitable distribution. 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 
1988) • 
Id. at 956. Thus, the existence of goodwill is a factual issue, 
varying from case to case, and its value may be distributed when 
appropriate. The Court then noted at least one factual 
circumstance which, if shown by evidence to the satisfaction of 
the district court, could preclude the existence of goodwill: 
There can be no good will in a business that is 
dependent for its existence upon the individual who 
conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. Jackson, 18 
Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670. 
Xd. at 956. In making this comment, the Court noted a factual 
defense to litigants in the position of Dr. Sorensen: Show that 
your professional practice is dependent solely on you for its 
existence and that it would vanish if you departed. Dr. Sorensen 
did not even attempt to prove these facts, or, if he did, the 
district court simply was not persuaded. Moreover, Dr. Austin, 
the expert witness, appraised the dental practice as a sale and 
as a consequence, drastically reduced the sale price by 66%. His 
expert testimony assumed Dr. Sorensen would no longer be 
associated with the practice. 
In each of the four opinions cited by Dr. Sorensen, 
Utah appellate courts have recognized goodwill as a marital asset 
which may be valued and distributed upon divorce. The Court of 
Appeals decision in Sorensen is not contrary to Utah law* 
mb. rcLaplbnefjor 11 
It is important to notice that Jackson (and the 
opinions noted in American Jurisprudence) deal exclusively with 
the existence of goodwill in a professional business and its 
division among associates upon dissolution of the business. The 
existence and apportionment of goodwill incident to a divorce are 
treated differently, however, A recent decision from the Arizona 
Supreme Court highlights the distinction: 
The confusion in this area of the law exists 
partially because many of the cases concerning the 
existence and evaluation of goodwill involve 
partnership dissolution, and not marital dissolution. 
Often the valuation of partnership assets, including 
goodwill, is controlled by the partnership agreement. 
In this case we are dealing with a marital dissolution 
which does not affect the continuation of the business 
partnership. The current situation is aptly described 
as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatically to the 
spouse licensed to practice it. He is not selling out 
or liquidating, but continuing in business. 
Effectively, it is the case of the silent partner 
withdrawing from a going business. And, if such 
partner is to receive fair compensation for her share, 
or her enforced retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882, 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962). 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. 
1987) . 
It is essential to the proper review of Dr. Sorensen's 
petition to focus only on those opinions which address goodwill 
in the context of a divorce. If that is done, a distinct pattern 
emerges: all but one of the jurisdictions in the Pacific region 
which have addressed the issue, hold goodwill in a professional 
mb.trlaplbriefjor 12 
business is a marital asset divisible upon divorce. It is the 
4
 See, e.g.; 
ARIZONA: 
Mitchell v. Mitchell. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987) 
Carriker v. Carriker. 151 Ariz. 296, 727 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1986) 
Wisner v. Wisnerf 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1981) 
CALIFORNIA: 
In Re Marriage of Fonstein. 17 Cal. 3d 738, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
873, 552 P.2d 1169 (1976) 
In Re Marriage of Watts. 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 217 
Cal. Rptr. 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1985) 
In Re Marriage of Fenton. 134 Cal. App. 3d 4451, 184 
Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal App. Ct. 1982) 
In Re Marriage of Slater. 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Webb. 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 
Cal. Rptr. 3 34 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Aufmuth. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 
Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Fortier. 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Golden v. Golden. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
735 (Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Fritschi v. Teed. 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1963) 
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1962) 
Mueller v. Mueller. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1956) 
Franklin v. Franklin. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1945) 
COLORADO: 
In Re Marriage of Nichols. 606 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 
(1979) 
KENTUCKY: 
Heller v. Heller. 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) 
(continued...) 
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favored rule elsewhere, too. 
There is no reason to treat the issue differently in 
this instance. Often the major asset of many marriages is the 
4(...continued) 
MONTANA; 
In Re Marriage of Hull. 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986) 
NEW MEXICO; 
Hertz V. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983) 
Hurley v. Hurley. 94 N.M. 651, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) 
OREGON; 
In Re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1976) 
In Re Marriage of Steinbrenner. 60 Or. App. 106, 652 P.2d 
845 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) 
WASHINGTON; 
In Re Marriage of Hall. 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984) 
Matter of Marriage of Fleege. 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 
1136 (1979) 
In Re Marriage of Freedman. 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Kaplan. 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) 
The issue was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Saviers v. Saviers. 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 (1968). There the 
wife appealed, alleging error by the trial court for its failure 
to find and value her husband's interest in the goodwill of his 
medical partnership. The Supreme Court found no error since the 
trial transcript did not contain any evidence from which value 
could be determined. 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho has held the goodwill of a 
family owned business (truck stop) is marital property which 
should be valued and distributed upon divorce. The court 
declined to resolve the issue in the context of a professional 
practice. Carr v. Carr, 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304, n. 4 at 309 
(Idaho App. 1985). 
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professional practice managed by one spouse. The goodwill of 
that practice can be valued by generally accepted accounting 
methods5 and its value can be allocated between the parties. Dr. 
Sorensen will continue to benefit from the goodwill established 
in his dental practice. Failure to value that goodwill and 
compensate Ms. Sorensen accordingly does not comport with an 
equitable distribution scheme. 
B. The Court of Appeals Considered all Appropriate 
Evidence of Value. 
Dr. Sorensen contends no evidence was offered at trial 
to establish the value of the dental practice as of the date of 
marriage and what evidence of value there was, indicated the 
dental practice was a premarital asset of Dr. Sorensen1s. The 
issue is not properly before this Court. It was never raised in 
Dr. Sorensen!s initial brief, in his reply brief or at oral 
argument. It was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. It 
cannot be raised now in the petition for the first time. 
II. CONSIDERATION OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE IN THE VALUATION OF 
GOODWILL IS NOT CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW. 
The district court included the value of accounts 
receivable in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen!s dental 
practice. He was awarded the practice with an equalizing credit 
to Ms. Sorensen. He argued to the Court of Appeals that the 
accounts receivable represented deferred income from which he 
5
 See, e.g., American Dental Association, Valuation of a 
Dental Practice: A Brief Overview for Buyers and Sellers 
(undated). 
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could pay his child support and short-term alimony obligations. 
Since they were income, he contended, it was error to include 
them as an asset of the dental practice. He relied exclusively 
on a quotation from Doqu for support of his argument: "The 
corporation's accounts receivable represent defined income from 
which respondent may meet his ongoing alimony and child support 
obligations to appellant." Id. at 1309. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It was not persuaded 
that the statement from Doqu stands for the proposition that 
accounts receivable may never be considered in the valuation of a 
professional corporation. Even a cursory glance at Doqu reveals 
it says nothing of the kind. The Supreme Court did not preclude 
consideration of receivables. Rather, the Court was only 
summarizing the district court's plan for distribution of the 
value of the husband's professional corporation to demonstrate 
that the district court had not abused its discretion. The Court 
of Appeals also observed that Dr. Sorensen had not cited any 
other authority for his argument and then it noted that other 
jurisdictions regularly include accounts receivable in the 
property distribution and find error when it is not. 
III. THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS WAS EQUITABLE AND NEED NOT BE 
PRECISELY EQUAL. 
Dr. Sorensen contends Dr. Austin's valuation of the 
dental practice failed to consider $10,129.00 in accounts 
payable. The Court of Appeals held the record was unclear on the 
issue, but that even if the full amount of the accounts payable 
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had not been considered, it was harmless error because the 
distribution of marital assets need not be precisely equal, only 
equitable. Dr. Sorensen contends the ruling of the Court of 
Appeals was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its authority. 
His argument is not correct. 
The district court attempted to divide the marital 
property evenly, giving each spouse approximately $131,000 in 
assets. If it is true the accounts payable were not considered 
— in effect, awarding slightly less to Dr. Sorensen — the 
distribution is not error. 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that a division of 
marital assets need not be mathematically precise and equal. 
Corning v. Corning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah App. 1987) ("While 
equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical equality is not 
essential or required," citing Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1985) and Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982)). 
Rather, the task of the district court is to provide an equitable 
adjustment of the parties' financial resources: 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties, [sic] it is a prerogative of 
the court to make whatever disposition of property as 
it deems fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. In the division 
of marital property, the trial judge has wide 
discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed 
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). True to 
these guidelines, and in consideration of the total property 
distribution between the parties, the Court of Appeals held the 
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district court had accomplished an equitable distribution which 
would not be disturbed on appeal. To do otherwise, as Dr. 
Sorensen suggests, would obligate Utah appellate courts to render 
an accounting for every property distribution, approving only 
those whose awards balanced precisely and setting aside all 
others. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' AWARD OF EXPENSES FOR EXPERT WITNESSES 
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH UTAH LAW. 
Dr. Sorensenfs final argument challenges the award of 
expert witness fees. The district court ordered the parties to 
bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, except the 
expense of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser, which the 
parties were to divide evenly. (R. 96; Decree 5 23). The award 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Dr. Sorensen contends (his 
Petition at 19-20) this Court held in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 138 
(Utah 1980) that expert witness fees may not be taxed as costs 
beyond the $14 per diem rate permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 
(1953) .6 
Section 21-5-4 provides: 
Every witness legally required or in good faith 
requested to attend upon a city or district court or a 
grand jury is entitled to $14 per day for each day in 
attendance and 30 cents for each mile actually and 
necessarily traveled in going only; provided, that in 
case of a witnessfs attending from without the state in 
a civil case, mileage for such witness shall be allowed 
and taxed for the distance actually and necessarily 
traveled within the state in going only. 
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The argument is not persuasive, for it is factually 
inaccurate. On August 13, 1986, a pretrial conference was 
conducted by the Domestic Relations Commissioner, B. Maurice 
Richards. (R. 55). The parties agreed at the conference to have 
their real property appraised by an appraiser who was acceptable 
to them both. The expense of the appraiser was borne initially 
by Dr. Sorensen; the decision of ultimate responsibility for 
payment was left to the court for subsequent determination. The 
parties1 agreement is memorialized in handwritten notes appearing 
on the bottom of the Pretrial Conference Work Sheet. (R. 54). 
They read: 
Parties are having the real property appraisal by 
an agreed appraiser — Def. to pay costs initially and 
court decides who finally pays. 
The parties later selected Mr. Heiskanen as their appraiser. 
Their understanding, specifically including the selection of Mr. 
Heiskanen, was made a part of the pre-trial order on September 4, 
1986: 
An appraisal of the family home occupied by 
plaintiff, the dental office occupied by defendant, and 
the farm in Liberty, Utah, will be made by Alan 
Heiskanen with the cost of said appraisals to be paid 
by defendant and the ultimate responsibility for the 
cost of said appraisals to be determined by the Court. 
(R. 57-58). Dr. Sorensenfs trial attorney, Mr. Echard, approved 
the form of the order. (R. 59). He did not file an objection to 
it; neither did he request further hearing on it. Dr. Sorensen 
is deemed to have consented to the order. 
Mr. Heiskanen appraised the properties and testified at 
trial about their value. (Tr. Vol. I at 6-36). The district 
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court then divided evenly between the parties the responsibility 
for payment of his expenses. That is precisely what the parties 
and the pretrial proceedings contemplated. 
The Court of Appeals agreed. Stipulations are binding, 
unless a party shows good cause to warrant relief. Higley v. 
McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). The Court of Appeals 
held Dr. Sorensen had not shown any justification, aside from his 
disagreement with Mr. Heiskanen's valuation of the property. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sorensen asks the Court (i) to deny the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari; (ii) to award her the costs she has 
incurred in this proceeding; and (iii) to award her attorney's 
fees for defending this proceeding. 
DATED: June 16, 1989. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Elaine S. Sorensen 
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